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WARRANTING DATA SECURITY 
Juliet M. Moringiello* 
INTRODUCTION 
Massive data security breaches have grabbed headlines in the past few 
years. The data thieves responsible for these breaches have stolen the credit 
and debit card data of customers of retailers such as TJ Maxx,1 DSW Shoe 
Warehouse,2 BJ’s Wholesale Club,3 and the Hannaford grocery store chain.4 
A thief in control of payment card data, which can include debit and credit 
card numbers, expiration dates, security codes, and personal identification 
numbers,5 has the ability to open new credit accounts and make charges on 
existing consumer accounts. These data breaches leave individuals fearful 
that their personal information will be used in ways that will disrupt their 
financial transactions and damage their credit.6 
The legal protection of privacy in the United States is far from 
comprehensive.7 The level of privacy protection provided to individuals 
depends on the sector of the economy in which they are participating.8 One 
sector of the economy in which privacy legislation exists is the financial 
sector, but the protection provided by such legislation is not 
comprehensive.9  Although individuals may think that they have some 
protected right to financial privacy because of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, that statute—which requires financial institutions to disclose their 
privacy policies to consumers—does nothing to protect the consumer when 
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her financial information is stolen from the payment system.10 Despite the 
fact that almost all states have provided a measure of protection to 
consumers by enacting data breach notification statutes, these statutes 
merely require companies that hold consumer data to notify consumers of a 
breach so that the consumers can protect themselves.11 Data breach 
notification statutes do not grant a private right of action to consumers to 
recover their losses.12 A comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme 
allocates losses in the credit and debit card systems, and this scheme tends 
to pass fraud losses on to the banks that issue the cards.13 While this scheme 
insulates the individual cardholders from most of the major financial losses 
resulting from a data breach, it does nothing to compensate the cardholders 
for the time and money they must spend to monitor their credit, obtain 
replacement cards, cancel and reinstate recurring automatic payments, and 
repair their credit in cases in which the data was used to open new 
fraudulent accounts. 
Consumers affected by data breaches understandably feel exposed to 
serious financial harm, even in the absence of liability for fraudulent 
charges. A consumer’s credit score affects her ability to finance important 
purchases, and the events that occur in the aftermath of a data breach can 
negatively affect that score.14 Because their losses are not addressed by 
existing privacy and payment system statutes, consumers have attempted to 
recover them using various common law theories; such theories, however, 
have uniformly failed to provide them any meaningful recovery for these 
losses.15 In this Article, I will discuss cases in which consumers have been 
denied recovery for losses arising out of data breaches. I then focus on a 
novel argument made by the plaintiffs in the Hannaford case. The 
Hannaford plaintiffs argued that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
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Code (UCC) should provide a remedy to individuals harmed by a data 
breach because every time a retailer accepts a payment card from a buyer, it 
warrants that its payment system is secure.16 
While a warranty of data security might be a good idea, Article 2 is not 
the best place for it because of its limitation to sales of goods. Instead, 
courts could impose a common law warranty of data security, under which 
all sellers would warrant that their chosen payment system is secure. In this 
Article, I will propose a non-waivable common-law warranty of data 
security that is drawn from both Article 2 warranties and the warranties 
provided in Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC which apply to negotiable 
instruments and the check collection system.17 I will then compare the 
problem of ensuring safe data transactions today to the problem of ensuring 
the habitability of rental housing in the mid-20th century, which judges 
addressed by imposing an implied warranty of habitability in leases for 
residential real property.18 The story of that warranty can add to the 
discussion about how best to ensure the safety of personal financial data.19 
To develop my argument, in Part I, I will describe the mechanics of a 
data breach. In Part II, I will focus on the case law to discuss the difficulties 
that consumers face in recovering their data breach losses. I discuss various 
UCC warranties in Part III, and in Part IV, I analogize today’s data security 
problems to the problems of scarce habitable rental housing in the mid-
twentieth century and suggest that today’s courts should protect personal 
financial data by imposing a warranty modeled in part on the warranty of 
habitability developed by courts in the 1970s. I conclude by calling on 
courts to develop a common-law warranty to compensate individuals 
harmed by data breaches. 
I. ANATOMY OF A DATA BREACH 
A payment card transaction involves four parties—the card issuer, the 
customer, the merchant, and the merchant bank—each of which is in 
control of payment data at some point in the transaction.20 The role of 
merchant bank is complicated because a merchant bank may itself act as 
acquirer or processor, or it may sponsor access to the payment card network 
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for its partner transaction processor.21 Some data breaches, such as the TJ 
Maxx data breach, involved data in the merchant’s control.22 Others, such 
as the Heartland Payment Systems (Heartland) breach, involved data in the 
processor’s control.23 In some cases, it is difficult to determine the identity 
of the party at fault for the breach, and as a result, the retailer and its 
payment processor are often both named as defendants in data breach 
suits.24 
The TJ Maxx breach, which was discovered by the company in 
December 2006, involved customer data held in the company’s computer 
systems.25 In a Securities and Exchange Commission filing, the company 
claimed that the data thieves, using software they placed in the company’s 
systems without authorization, captured both unencrypted and encrypted 
data.26 The company reported in its filing that it believed that the hackers 
had access to the decryption tool for the encryption software used by TJ 
Maxx.27 According to one news report on the breach, this decryption tool 
could have been acquired by an insider who participated in the data theft or 
by a successful entry into the TJ Maxx database where the decryption keys 
were held.28 
The Heartland and Hannaford breaches were different from prior 
attacks in that the hackers focused not on data stored in a consumer 
database, but on data as it moved from the stores to the credit card 
processors.29 In late 2007, fraudsters breached Heartland’s system by a 
method known as SQL injection,30 which allowed them to exploit a 
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for defining and manipulating data in a relational database.” IBM, SQL REFERENCE VOLUME 1, 1 
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s1e90.pdf. For a good explanation of how SQL works and a detailed description of some of the 
high-profile data breaches mentioned in this article, see generally James Verini, The Hacker Who 
Went Into the Cold, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 14, 2010, at 44. 
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vulnerability in Heartland’s corporate and payment processing networks.31 
They then installed software that captured payment card data as it moved 
through Heartland’s system.32 In early 2008, Hannaford discovered that 
hackers had placed malicious software on their servers to capture payment 
card information.33 The software picked up credit card numbers and 
expiration dates as they traveled through the system and sent that 
information to overseas servers.34 
It is important to note that the Payment Cards Industry Standards 
Council, founded by the five payment card networks, manages a set of 
security standards (known collectively as the Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard, or PCI DSS)35 with which all merchants and processors 
must comply in order to participate in the card payment systems.36 While TJ 
Maxx had not fully complied with the PCI DSS standards,37 Heartland had 
been certified as compliant at the time its system was breached.38 PCI DSS 
is not seen as the “gold standard” in data security, however, and most 
companies do more to protect their data than is required by PCI DSS.39 
The amount of data compromised in these breaches can be staggering. 
The Hannaford data breach resulted in the theft of 4.2 million credit and 
debit card numbers and related information such as PIN codes.40 The DSW 
Shoe Warehouse breach involved more than 1.4 million credit and debit 
card numbers and almost 100,000 checking account numbers and driver’s 
license numbers.41 The BJ’s Wholesale Club breach allowed “unauthorized 
parties [to gain] access to magnetic stripe data from 9.2 million credit 
cards.”42 The TJ Maxx breach was one of the largest, with 94 million 
compromised records, according to one estimate.43 The largest breach to 
date was the Heartland breach, which affected about 130 million credit and 
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debit cards.44 These breaches have exposed the personal financial data of 
millions of individuals, giving unauthorized parties the ability to enter into 
fraudulent payment card transactions. The data thief is often hard to find, so 
the data breach victims seek recovery from the company to whom they 
entrusted their information by making a payment.45 Although consumers are 
protected from liability for the fraudulent transactions themselves, they 
have had almost no success recovering other costs arising from these 
breaches.46 
II. THWARTED ATTEMPTS TO RECOVER FOR DATA THEFT 
Rules governing both credit cards and debit cards protect consumers 
from most of the liability for fraudulent charges. The Truth in Lending Act 
limits the liability of a consumer for unauthorized use of her credit card to 
$5047 and many credit card issuers promise no liability to cardholders if the 
cardholder notifies the issuer immediately after the card was lost or stolen.48 
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act contains a $50 liability limitation for the 
unauthorized use of a debit card, but the consumer can be liable for a 
greater amount if she fails to report the loss of her card within a prescribed 
amount of time.49 Yet data breaches cause consumers to suffer a wide range 
of other financial and non-financial harms. 
Consumer plaintiffs in data breach cases have alleged a variety of 
harms. Although they ultimately incur little to no liability for unauthorized 
charges, consumer victims of a data breach spend time and money to 
address and resolve their financial disruptions.50 For example, an individual 
whose personal information has been compromised as a result of a data 
breach often feels the need to pay to monitor her credit51 because an 
unauthorized party might use the stolen data to assume the affected 
individual’s identity and obtain credit or other benefits fraudulently in that 
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 49. Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 § 909, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (2006). 
 50. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 116. 
 51. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2007); In re Hannaford Bros. 
Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 116; Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 
(W.D. Mich. 2006); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019 (D. Minn. 
2006). 
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person’s name.52 If that individual finds unauthorized payments or charges 
on her bank and credit card statements, she must take the time to contest the 
fraudulent charges. As a result, many victims of a data breach seek 
compensation for credit monitoring costs.53 The Hannaford plaintiffs 
alleged a comprehensive list of harms, which covered almost everything 
that can happen when the security of a credit or debit card is 
compromised.54 Some customers were deprived of the use of their cards 
because their bank accounts were overdrawn and their credit limits were 
exceeded.55 Customers also lost bonus points on their cards for the period of 
time when their cards were cancelled.56 Some banks required customers to 
pay for replacement cards.57 Customers were also forced to spend time 
dealing with pre-authorized charges because they had to give new credit 
card numbers to the payees to whom the pre-authorized payments were 
made.58 When a consumer’s pre-authorized payments cannot be made 
because the credit card on file is not valid, the consumer incurs additional 
charges such as late fees. Therefore, the Hannaford plaintiffs also claimed 
damages for the disruption of their pre-authorized charge relationships.59  
Courts have rejected consumer attempts to recover these costs. 
Most courts have found that the harms caused by the exposure of personal 
financial information are too speculative to form the basis for a claim for 
damages in either contract or tort law.60 In Pisciotta v. Old National 
Bancorp, the plaintiffs sought compensation, under a negligence theory, for 
both the credit monitoring services they were forced to obtain and for the 
emotional distress that they suffered after their personal financial 
information was taken from the defendant bank’s Web site.61 In order to 
recover on their negligence claim, the plaintiffs were required to show that 
they suffered “a compensable injury proximately caused by [the bank’s] 
breach of duty.”62 To show that they had suffered a compensable harm, the 
plaintiffs pointed to the Indiana data breach notification statute, arguing that 
the Indiana legislature, by enacting such a statute, agreed that consumers 
suffer compensable harm at the moment their personal financial information 
                                                                                                                                          
 52. See Heartland Settlement Agreement, supra note 45, at 12–13. 
 53. See, e.g., Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 631; In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 116; 
Forbes, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1020. 
 54. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 116. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007); Forbes v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006); Hendricks v. DSW Shoe 
Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779–81 (W.D. Mich. 2006). 
 61. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 631–32. 
 62. Id. at 635 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216–17 (Ind. 
2000)). 
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is compromised by a data breach.63 The court rejected this argument, noting 
the absence of any statement by the legislature that it intended to allow such 
a recovery.64 
The plaintiffs in Forbes v. Wells Fargo were also denied recovery for 
credit monitoring costs.65 In that case, the plaintiffs sued Wells Fargo for 
both negligence and breach of contract when their financial information was 
stolen from a Wells Fargo service provider.66 The court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ arguments, holding that credit monitoring expenses were not 
incurred because of any present injury, but were rather incurred to prevent 
future injury, stressing that the plaintiffs’ injuries were “solely the result of 
a perceived risk of future harm.”67 The court denied the plaintiffs’ breach of 
contract claims in Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse because the plaintiff 
did not prove that her personal information had been used in any way and 
therefore had suffered no cognizable loss.68 The court characterized the 
plaintiffs’ claim for credit monitoring costs as “damages to buy peace of 
mind.”69 
Although several plaintiffs have attempted to recover for their losses on 
a breach of contract theory, the Hannaford plaintiffs made a particularly 
novel contract argument. They argued that every time Hannaford accepted a 
payment card, it impliedly warranted that its payment system “was fit for its 
intended purpose, namely the safe and secure processing of credit and debit 
card payment transactions,” and that this warranty was breached because 
the system “allowed wrongdoers to steal the customers’ confidential 
personal and financial data.”70 This resembles the implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose from Article 2 of the UCC.71 The plaintiffs 
argued not that the Article 2 warranty applies by its terms to payment 
processing transactions, but that Article 2 “provides an ‘analogue’ on which 
[the] . . . court should draw in crafting a common law implied warranty to 
fit their situation.”72 
The court refused to imply such a warranty for several reasons, 
focusing on the requirements of Article 2.73 In order for a warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose to be implied in a contract of sale, the seller 
must have reason to know of two facts: the particular purpose for which the 
                                                                                                                                          
 63. Id. at 637. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006). 
 66. Id. at 1020. 
 67. Id. at 1021. 
 68. Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779–81 (W.D. Mich. 
2006). 
 69. Id. at 780. 
 70. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 119–20 
(D. Me. 2009) (quotations omitted). 
 71. U.C.C. § 2-315 (2002). 
 72. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 120. 
 73. Id. 
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buyer requires the goods, and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or 
judgment in selecting or furnishing such goods.74 The court emphasized that 
the warranty applies to goods sold, and the definition of goods does not 
include the payment system used to process the payment for the goods.75 In 
addition, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is implied 
not when a buyer seeks goods for their ordinary purpose, but only when a 
buyer seeks goods for a purpose that is particular to that buyer’s needs.76 
The court correctly observed that the buyers did not use the payment system 
for a particular purpose;77 instead, they relied on it to process credit and 
debit card payments in the same way as did all other grocery purchasers.78 
However, while Article 2 may not be the best place to locate a warranty 
or provide the best analogy, implying a warranty of data security in 
consumer payment transactions is a good idea. A better analogy might be 
the non-waivable implied warranty of habitability developed by courts in 
the early 1970s to respond to the societal changes wrought by 
urbanization.79  As I will discuss in Part IV, some of the same concerns that 
drove the courts of forty years ago to protect consumers of urban rental 
housing exist today in the area of payment data security.80 
An implied warranty of data security would allow consumers to recover 
their losses without overly straining established legal doctrines. Today, 
there are two major impediments to recovery for the losses that individuals 
incur as a result of a data breach. The first, applicable to both contract and 
tort actions, is that the damages are seen as too speculative.81 Second, 
purely economic losses that are not coupled with personal injury or physical 
property damage are not recoverable in tort.82 One justification for this 
doctrine is to allow parties to allocate their economic losses by contract.83 In 
the consumer context, however, reliance on freedom of contract often fails 
to protect consumer welfare.84 Because of this preference for freedom of 
contract, consumers appear doomed to absorb some costs of data breaches 
themselves. In order for an implied warranty of data security to truly protect 
                                                                                                                                          
 74. U.C.C. § 2-315 (2002). 
 75. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 120. 
 76. U.C.C. § 2-315, cmt. 2. 
 77. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 120. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 80. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 81. See cases cited supra note 60. 
 82. In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d at 127; JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-5, at 538–39 (6th ed. 2010); Michael D. Scott, 
Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 
425, 470 (2008). 
 83. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 11-5, at 541. 
 84. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 
(2008) (arguing that markets for consumer credit function only when consumers are rational and 
informed). 
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consumers, it would have to be non-waivable. There is precedent for non-
waivable warranties both in the UCC and the common law.85 The remainder 
of this Article will discuss the various warranties that are implied in 
commercial transactions, and will propose that an implied warranty of data 
security be imposed on retailers. 
III. EXISTING UCC WARRANTIES: CAN WE EXPAND THEM TO 
PROTECT DATA? 
The proposed warranty of data security would be implied in all 
contracts between a seller accepting a payment card and the buyer using 
that card. The seller is the best person to give such a warranty because the 
seller is the party who deals with the consumer and is also the party that the 
consumer trusts to handle her payments safely. The seller would be 
warranting the safety of a transaction, not a product. Nevertheless, elements 
of several UCC warranties can be incorporated into an implied warranty of 
data security. 
The UCC implies several warranties under Article 2, which governs 
sales of goods, and Articles 3 and 4, which govern some aspects of the 
payment system.86 The persons giving these warranties represent that a 
product,87 a transaction,88 or both89 meet certain quality and reliability 
requirements. Parties to a transaction can waive some,90 but not all,91 of 
these warranties. Although a payment card transaction falls strictly outside 
of the UCC’s scope—and therefore a warranty protecting it could not find a 
home in the UCC—an implied warranty of data security could draw on and 
combine elements of several of these warranties. In the remainder of this 
section, I will discuss the elements of the UCC warranties that should be 
included in a warranty of data security and argue that a warranty approach 
to the data breach problem has several advantages over a tort approach. 
A. UCC PRODUCT WARRANTIES 
Under the implied warranties of merchantability92 and fitness for a 
particular purpose,93 a seller in a transaction governed by Article 2 promises 
that goods sold meet some standard of quality (in the case of 
                                                                                                                                          
 85. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081–82 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(holding that the implied warranty of habitability is non-waivable); U.C.C. § 3-417(e) (2003) 
(providing that the Article 3 presentment warranty cannot be waived with respect to checks). 
 86. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-312–317, 2-321, 3-318, 3-415–416, 4-207–209 (2002). 
 87. See infra notes 93–123 and accompanying text. 
 88. See infra notes 125–134 and accompanying text. 
 89. See infra notes 135–137 and accompanying text. 
 90. U.C.C. § 2-316 (2002) (setting forth the requirements for Article 2 warranty disclaimers). 
 91. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-417(e) (2003) (providing that the Article 3 presentment warranty 
cannot be disclaimed with respect to checks). 
 92. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2002). 
 93. Id. § 2-315. 
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merchantability) or of suitability (in the case of fitness for a particular 
purpose). A seller in a payment card transaction is providing two different 
things: the product or service sold, and the system that processes the 
payment. 
A discussion of an argument that the Hannaford plaintiffs could have 
but failed to make illustrates some of the advantages and disadvantages in 
using Article 2 of the UCC to protect payment card data. Rather than asking 
the court to apply the Article 2 warranties by analogy, the Hannaford 
plaintiffs could have argued that the payment system software itself 
breached the warranty of merchantability that is implied, unless excluded, 
in all contracts covered by Article 2.94 Most courts have held that the 
transfer of software is a sale of goods for the purpose of Article 2.95 
However, the software warranty in a payment card transaction would first 
run from the payment software vendor to the retailer, leaving the plaintiffs 
with a privity barrier, one that I will explain below. 
An examination of this hypothetical argument highlights some of the 
benefits that an implied warranty might give consumers in payment card 
transactions and also illustrates the impediments that consumers would face 
in relying on existing warranties. First, the warranty of merchantability is 
implied in all contracts for the sale of goods in which the seller is a 
merchant.96 The UCC defines a merchant as “a person who deals in goods 
of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having 
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the 
transaction.”97 All merchants give this warranty because they, as merchant 
sellers, hold themselves out as having special knowledge with respect to the 
products sold.98 A buyer need not show that he relied on any representations 
made by the seller in order to recover for breach of warranty.99 Because the 
warranty of merchantability is implied, unless excluded, in all transactions 
in which goods are sold by a merchant, it is curious that the Hannaford 
plaintiffs did not try to claim damages for its breach.100 
The application to all merchant seller transactions is one element of the 
warranty of merchantability that should be incorporated into a warranty of 
data security. For this purpose, a merchant can be defined as anyone who 
                                                                                                                                          
 94. Id. 
 95. Scott, supra note 82, at 436 (discussing judicial classification of software). 
 96. U.C.C. § 2-314. 
 97. Id. § 2-104(1). 
 98. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 10-11, at 482 (tracing the logic behind the warranty 
of merchantability to the pre-Code warranty implied in transactions with manufacturers). 
 99. Id. 
 100. According to the two leading commentators on the UCC, a key reason that a transferee 
might seek to classify its transaction as a purchase of goods is to receive the benefit of Article 2’s 
warranty of merchantability. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 10-2, at 449. 
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accepts a payment card for goods or services.101 Merchant sellers choose the 
persons responsible for handling the data that they collect,102 so imposing a 
warranty on these sellers would force them to choose their payment 
processors carefully and to negotiate indemnification clauses with those 
processors. 
To satisfy the implied warranty of merchantability, the seller must 
provide goods that “are fit for the ordinary purposes for which [they] are 
used”103 and that “pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description.”104 A merchant who provides customers with the convenience 
of using a card payment system should be deemed to represent that its 
payment system is fit for the ordinary purpose for which a payment system 
is used—the safe and secure processing of a purchaser’s payment data. One 
of the reasons the plaintiffs’ warranty argument failed in the Hannaford 
case was that the plaintiffs had chosen to argue for a warranty of fitness for 
a particular purpose despite the fact that the payment system was actually 
being used for its ordinary purpose.105 An argument that the payment 
system in the transaction was not fit for its ordinary purposes might have 
fared better. 
There are two major intertwined problems with arguing that an 
individual victim of a data breach can recover from the provider of payment 
software under the implied warranty of merchantability. First, the implied 
warranty of merchantability can be disclaimed in the contract between the 
buyer and seller.106 Sellers of goods tend not to disclaim this warranty 
altogether, choosing instead to limit the damages recoverable because 
concerns for future business force attention to quality.107 
One reason that suing the payment system software vendors is 
undesirable is that the problem of warranty disclaimers is magnified when 
the product transferred is software. The tumultuous drafting history of 
Article 2B of the UCC (which became the Uniform Computer Information 
                                                                                                                                          
 101. Individuals making isolated sales could be exempted from this definition. U.C.C. § 2-314 
cmt. 3 (2002) (exempting a person making an isolated sale from the Article 2 implied warranty of 
merchantability). These individuals do not participate in the payment system by choosing from a 
variety of payment processors; if they do accept payment cards, they do so through person-to-
person payment systems such as PayPal. See PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com (select “personal” 
tab; then select “get paid” from top bar; then select “accept credit cards” from drop-down list) 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (explaining how individuals can accept payment cards through PayPal 
from persons who do not have PayPal accounts). 
 102. Businesses can choose among many payment processing service companies. See, e.g., 
ACH PAYMENTS, http://www.ach-payments.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2010); ELIOT 
MANAGEMENT GROUP, http://www.e-mg.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2010); HEARTLAND 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, http://www.heartlandpaymentsystems.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2010). 
 103. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c). 
 104. Id. § 2-314(2)(a). 
 105. See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 120 
(D. Me. 2009). 
 106. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2002). 
 107. DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 151 (4th ed. 2009). 
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Transactions Act after the American Law Institute withdrew from the 
project) shows how averse software vendors are to Article 2 warranty 
liability.108 Software vendors almost universally disclaim the warranty of 
merchantability because vendors contend that “[c]omputer software has 
peculiar qualities” that render a comparison among software programs 
senseless.109 Such a comparison is necessary in order to determine that 
software would “pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description,” for the purpose of the warranty of merchantability.110 
Second, even in the unlikely absence of a disclaimer, the aggrieved 
individuals would have difficulty recovering for a breach of warranty 
because they never buy or take a transfer of the payment processing 
software.111  Because warranty liability is based on contract law, the general 
rule is that a warrantor is directly liable only to the person with whom it has 
a contract.112 The harsh effects of this general rule have been ameliorated in 
the sale of goods area, and today, most manufacturer warranties run to the 
ultimate buyer for two reasons. First, most states have eliminated the 
vertical privity requirement by common law when a consumer is personally 
injured by a manufacturer’s product.113 Second, most manufacturers, for 
reasons of reputation, treat their warranties as though they run to the 
ultimate purchaser.114 
This erosion of the privity barrier would not assist a consumer harmed 
by a data breach, however. Although Article 2 of the UCC allows non-
buyers affected by a product to sue for breach of warranty, most states, in 
their versions of Article 2, deny a cause of action to a third party non-buyer 
in the absence of personal injury.115 A person whose payment card data has 
been stolen has not suffered any personal injury. In states that have adopted 
the third alternative to § 2-318, a third party has a cause of action against 
                                                                                                                                          
 108. See generally Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability 
Theory in Cases of Deficient Software Design, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 269 (1999) (discussing the 
Article 2B drafting process). 
 109. Robert Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in Software Contracts: A 
Warranty No One Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 393, 398–99 (1997); Jane K. Winn, Are “Better” Security Breach Notification Laws 
Possible?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133, 1150 (2009) (quoting Scott, supra note 82, at 426) 
(explaining that “software vendors have traditionally . . . used various risk allocation provisions of 
[the U.C.C.] to shift the risk of insecure software to the licensee”). 
 110. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2) (2002); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 109 (explaining that, as 
essentially diverse collections of ideas that cannot reasonably be compared to one another, 
attempts to identify minimum quality standards for software products would be difficult and 
unfair). 
 111. See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 121 
(D. Me. 2009); see also Cheney, supra note 20, at 1–2 (describing a credit card transaction). 
 112. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313–315 (2000); see also Metro. Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 
(2d Cir. 1946) (“A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact 
upon which the other party may rely.”). 
 113. KEATING, supra note 107, at 178–79. 
 114. Id. at 178. 
 115. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 12-3, at 546. 
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the seller if it is “injured” by the breach of warranty.116 This alternative 
would seem to allow someone harmed by payment processing software to 
recover. In these states, however, a seller can disclaim the warranty as to 
third parties who did not suffer personal injury as a result of the breach of 
warranty.117 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the hurdles that a consumer would 
face in attempting to recover damages from a payment software vendor for 
breach of the Article 2 implied warranty of merchantability. Although 
imposition of the Article 2 implied warranty of merchantability to payment 
transactions is not feasible, the policies underlying the warranty are 
particularly salient to today’s electronic payment transactions. Before the 
mass production of goods, buyers were bound by caveat emptor and no 
warranties were implied.118 The old law was based on a system in which 
traders were neighbors.119 Caveat emptor was considered just in face-to-
face transactions in which the seller and buyer had roughly equal 
commercial experience and the buyer had ample opportunity to inspect the 
goods he was buying.120 Over the course of the last century, courts and 
legislatures have chipped away at the doctrine, recognizing the inequality of 
knowledge and bargaining power between buyers and sellers.121 As mass 
production of goods proliferated, warranties were imposed on professional 
sellers.122 The move away from caveat emptor was slower in real estate law, 
as mass production of housing did not emerge until after World War II.123 
Caveat emptor has no place in card payment transactions. Payment 
processing transactions are completely invisible to consumers. The clerk at 
my local grocery store will ask me whether I want to use my Visa debit card 
(which is not a credit card) as a “debit or credit” card, having no idea that 
she is asking me which payment network (the Visa network or the PIN-
based debit card network) I want to use.124  
B. UCC TRANSACTION WARRANTIES 
The discussion above analogizes a warranty of data security to a 
warranty of product quality. The UCC imposes transaction warranties as 
well,125 and a data security warranty might be better analogized to such a 
                                                                                                                                          
 116. U.C.C. § 2-318 (2003). 
 117. Id. § 2-318 cmt. 2. 
 118. See Timothy J. Sullivan, Innovation in the Law of Warranty: The Burden of Reform, 32 
HASTINGS L.J. 341, 356 (1980). 
 119. See Allison Dunham, Vendor’s Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, 
37 MINN. L. REV. 108, 110 (1952). 
 120. See Sullivan, supra note 118, at 356. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. at 356–57. 
 123. See Dunham, supra note 119, at 111. 
 124. I would not know that either had I not taught Payment Systems for a number of years. 
 125. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-312 (2002). 
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warranty. These transaction warranties also contain elements that a court 
could incorporate in an implied warranty of data security. Unlike the 
warranty of merchantability, the implied warranty of title helps to ensure 
the quality of the transaction in which the goods are transferred.126 
Therefore, a seller giving a warranty of title promises that the transaction is 
reliable.127 Under Article 2, all sellers give a warranty that title to the goods 
“shall be good and its transfer rightful.”128 This warranty has nothing to do 
with the quality of the product, rather it relates to the transactions in which 
the goods reach the seller. If there is a thief in the chain of title, the seller 
breaches the warranty.129 The UCC permits a seller to disclaim this 
warranty, but any disclaimer must clearly indicate that the seller claims no 
title in the goods sold.130 
The purpose behind this warranty is to ensure that the buyer will not be 
exposed to litigation in order to protect its title to the goods because of 
defects in purchase transactions in his chain of title.131 Although the implied 
warranty of title looks backwards, holding the seller liable for the 
wrongdoing of persons in the past, its basic purpose, to protect the buyer 
from transaction defects, could be used as a basis for an implied warranty of 
data security. A data security warranty would necessarily be forward-
looking, but it would also serve to guarantee the quality of a chain of 
transactions, rather than a product. A warranty of data security can ensure 
that someone who uses a payment card will not be forced to incur costs to 
protect her personal information from misuse in the chain of transfers 
comprising a payment transaction. 
The warranty of title imposes strict liability on the seller.132 Under UCC 
§ 2-312, a seller is not protected from liability on the warranty of title by his 
lack of knowledge that the title conveyed is not good.133 A thief of goods 
breaks the chain of title, so the warranty of title functions to pass the risk 
that the transaction is not good to the person who dealt most closely with 
the thief.134 The result is to place the loss on the person best situated to 
avoid it. Using the same logic, a seller who takes a payment card is best 
situated to guard against unsafe payment transactions, and if it enters into 
an unsafe payment transaction with a consumer, it should bear the loss 
regardless of its knowledge that the transaction may be unsafe. 
In the payment system, as in the sales system, warranties play an 
important loss allocation function. Payment warranties pass the risk of fraud 
                                                                                                                                          
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. § 2-312(1)(a). 
 128. Id. § 2-312. 
 129. See West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037, 1045 (Colo. 2006). 
 130. U.C.C. § 2-312(3). 
 131. Id. § 2-312(1) cmt. 1. 
 132. Id. § 2-312. 
 133. KEATING, supra note 107, at 279.  
 134. See id. at 279–80. 
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to the person closest to the fraud. When a bank pays the wrong person by 
honoring a check bearing a forged endorsement, it must re-credit its 
customer’s account.135 The warranties under Article 4 of the UCC then 
allow the bank to seek compensation from persons up the collection 
stream.136 However, unlike most warrantors in the sales system, those 
giving payment warranties vouch for both the transaction and the product. 
The warrantor of a negotiable instrument vouches for the product (the 
negotiable instrument) in that it warrants that “the instrument has not been 
altered” and that “all signatures . . . are authentic and authorized,” but it also 
vouches for the transaction in that it warrants that it is “entitled to enforce 
the instrument” and that “the instrument is not subject to a defense or claim 
in recoupment by any party.”137 
In order to effectively protect personal financial information, the 
implied warranty of data security should be non-waivable. There is 
precedent in the UCC for a non-waivable warranty. The warranties in 
Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC cannot be disclaimed with respect to checks.138 
This prohibition of disclaimers protects the checking system; checks are 
collected and paid by automated means, so banks rely on the warranties for 
their protection.139 
Warranty is a good theory on which to give a remedy to injured 
consumers. Privity remains an issue in imposing a warranty of data security 
on data controllers. Privity is not a problem when the merchant itself is 
responsible for the breach, because that merchant will always have a 
contract with the aggrieved purchaser. Lack of privity, however, should not 
bar recovery from the payment processors. All consumers entering the 
payment system through a merchant, however, have a contract with that 
merchant.140 Therefore, imposing a warranty on that merchant makes sense; 
that merchant must then either make sure that it protects the data, or 
negotiate an agreement with its processor that the processor will protect the 
data and indemnify the merchant from any losses as a result of a data 
breach. The retailer is in the best position to know whether its processor 
                                                                                                                                          
 135. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 82, § 16-3, at 754. 
 136. See id. 
 137. U.C.C. § 3-416 (2002) (setting forth transfer warranties); id. § 3-417 (setting forth 
presentment warranties, which do not include a warranty that there are no defenses or claims in 
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handles data safely, and can choose to use a more secure system if the 
processor will not cover losses from data breaches. 
Contract law, unlike tort law, allows recovery for purely economic loss. 
A buyer aggrieved by a breach of the warranty of merchantability can 
recover the difference in value between the goods accepted and the goods as 
warranted.141 This difference can be measured by the cost of repair.142 The 
damages claimed by consumer plaintiffs in data breach cases are in essence 
claims for the cost of repair to their credit profile, because a consumer who 
must pay for card replacement or credit monitoring is trying to restore the 
data to the condition it was in before the breach. Recognizing this type of 
remedy would eliminate one of the major hurdles to protecting data security 
through tort law—the limitations on economic loss damages. 
Some have suggested treating privacy concerns in a manner analogous 
to product safety.143 Although both tort law and contract law have a role in 
ensuring product safety, those who urge a product safety approach to 
privacy have focused primarily on tort law.144 Some have proposed a tort 
action based on strict products liability for data breaches;145 products 
liability law, however, does not often grant recovery for economic loss.146 
While some have argued that new technology begs a redefinition of 
injury,147 a warranty approach would not force courts to strain existing tort 
doctrine in that way. Every transaction in which payment data is passed is a 
contract transaction, either for goods, information, or services. Therefore, a 
contract will always exist into which a warranty of data security could be 
implied. The tendency of courts to rule that one party to a contract cannot 
sue the other party for negligence might make such an implied warranty 
preferable to a tort action.148 
There is no doubt that consumers are harmed by unauthorized uses of 
their personal financial data even in the absence of liability for the 
                                                                                                                                          
 141. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2002). A buyer can also recover incidental and consequential damages. 
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fraudulent charges made to their accounts. Although a warranty of data 
security is desirable, data security does not fit neatly into the existing UCC 
warranties for several reasons. First, the articles in the UCC are organized 
by type of transaction. Even if a warranty regarding goods could be 
stretched to include the payment system used to purchase the goods, many 
payment transactions do not involve goods. The payment system contains 
numerous warranties, but these warranties—designed to place the risk of 
fraud in checking and other negotiable instrument transactions on the 
person closest to the fraud—do nothing to compensate an individual who is 
harmed by identity theft. Revising the UCC to include data security within 
the Article 2 warranties is probably politically unfeasible149 and in addition, 
an Article 2 warranty would not give any recovery to those whose data was 
taken in a sale of services transaction. 
IV. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY: A GOOD 
ANALOGY? 
To adequately protect consumers, any warranty of data security should 
be implied in all payment card transactions between an individual and a 
merchant and should be non-waivable. The use of payment cards to pay for 
almost everything has allowed sellers and payment processors to collect 
tremendous amounts of personal financial information. Havoc ensues when 
this information falls into the wrong hands. The changes in the conduct of 
business wrought by the electronic processing of payments beg a judicially-
created remedy tailored to the emerging and serious problem of data theft. 
One can find precedent for such a remedy in landlord-tenant law. In this 
section, I will apply lessons from landlord-tenant law to the protection of 
payment card data. 
Real property law provides some precedent for judge-made, non-
waivable warranties to protect consumers. One that exists today—either by 
statute or case law in nearly every state and the District of Columbia—is the 
warranty of habitability implied in leases for residential real property.150 
This warranty that a dwelling be safe, clean, and fit for human habitation 
cannot be waived in a lease.151 
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The initial judicial imposition of this warranty recognized the 
modernization of the landlord-tenant relationship. When the common law 
landlord-tenant rules first developed, the typical lessee was more interested 
in the land than the dwelling and was expected to make repairs to the 
dwelling himself.152 The modern urban tenant is interested solely in a 
habitable dwelling, and has neither the ability nor economic incentive to 
make repairs to the dwelling because his lease is often for a fairly short 
term.153 Courts relied on consumer protection concepts to imply a warranty 
of habitability in all residential leases because tenants, particularly poor 
urban tenants, had little leverage to demand better quality housing.154 
In imposing implied warranties in residential leases and in contracts for 
the sale of new homes, courts recognized that the caveat emptor doctrine 
did nothing to protect tenants and home buyers.155 The justification for 
caveat emptor was that a tenant or buyer could “discover and protect 
himself against defects in [real] property.”156 In addition, traditional 
landlord-tenant law was developed for an agrarian society in which the land 
was much more valuable to the tenant than the dwelling.157 Modern tenants 
have far less bargaining power than their agrarian predecessors, and unlike 
those predecessors, the modern tenant does not have the skill to discover 
defects in a building’s complex systems.158 
Courts avoid rewriting contracts, and the courts that first read an 
implied warranty of habitability into residential leases recognized this 
limitation on their power.159 They justified the warranty by assuming that 
reasonable people would agree that housing must be “habitable and fit for 
living” and that therefore, if a landlord and tenant were to negotiate a lease, 
such a warranty would be included.160 
As society placed increasing value on safe, affordable rental housing, 
legislatures and administrative bodies began to enact statutes and 
regulations aimed at ensuring the availability of such housing.161 These 
codes and rules represented “a policy judgment—that it [was] socially (and 
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politically) desirable to impose [the duty of providing safe housing] on a 
property owner” and thus abolish the rule of caveat emptor.162 Describing 
the need for safe housing in the 1960s, one court urged that “[t]he need and 
social desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid 
population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal 
cliché, caveat emptor.”163 
The imposition of an implied warranty of habitability was seen as a 
move away from classifying a lease as a property conveyance to classifying 
a lease as a contract.164 Yet, by making the warranty of habitability non-
waivable, the courts veered from a freedom of contract approach. They 
recognized also that the validity of the distinctions between contract and 
property rules in landlord-tenant law was primarily historical and that 
courts have a duty to “reappraise old doctrines in the light of the facts and 
values of contemporary life.”165 In data security law, there is no such 
history to discard, and the law can be written on a cleaner slate, with 
protections pulled from contract, property, and tort law.166 William Prosser 
once described the implied warranty as “a freak hybrid born of the illicit 
intercourse of tort and contract.”167 This illicit intercourse might provide the 
right remedy for the theft of personal information; by importing contract 
law concepts, judges can avoid twisting tort law to evade its limitation on 
recovery for purely economic loss.168 
One challenge that courts will face in implying a warranty of data 
security is developing the standards that a payment system must meet in 
order to satisfy the warranty. Courts imposing an implied warranty of 
habitability were able to rely on housing codes for standards.169 In data 
breach cases, the proper source for the elements of a quality payment 
system is not as clear. In a case like DSW Shoe Warehouse, the plaintiffs 
could use the fact that the FTC had filed a complaint against the retailer, 
alleging that it had “fail[ed] to employ reasonable and appropriate security 
measures to protect personal information and files.”170 The failure to 
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comply with PCI DSS would clearly constitute a breach of warranty, but as 
noted above, PCI DSS is seen as a minimum standard of data security.171 
The judicially-created implied warranty of habitability was a response 
to changing social and economic conditions.172 Courts implied the warranty 
of habitability at a time when society started to recognize that shelter is a 
basic human necessity.173 The federal government recognized this in the 
Housing Act of 1949, “which committed [the government] to . . . achieving 
. . . the goal of a . . . suitable living environment for every American 
family.”174 While data security is not yet ingrained in our culture as a basic 
human need, lawmakers today are well aware that Americans may not 
“fully understand and appreciate what information is being collected about 
them” and may not have the power to stop unsafe practices from taking 
place.175 Legislatures that have enacted data breach notification laws 
likewise recognize that data theft is a significant problem; in fact California, 
the first state to enact such a law, did so after one of the state’s general 
purpose data centers suffered a security breach.176 The legislative findings 
accompanying that law recognized that identity theft was one of 
California’s fastest growing crimes, and that rapid notice of a data breach 
might help consumers minimize potential harm to them.177 
In imposing an implied warranty of habitability, courts recognized that 
when a tenant rents an apartment or a house, that tenant “seek[s] a well 
known package of goods and services” that includes working utilities and 
proper maintenance.178 Likewise, a consumer giving her payment card in a 
transaction expects that her information will be safeguarded in such a way 
that she will not be exposed to identity theft. Because she, like the urban 
tenant, cannot ensure the safety of her data on her own, courts should 
consider imposing a warranty of data security on sellers who accept 
payment cards. 
CONCLUSION 
Like residential tenants and buyers of new homes, the consumer who 
uses the payment system on a daily basis has little ability to protect herself 
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from data breaches. Some loss, therefore, should fall on the persons best 
able to guard against data theft. The real estate warranties are examples of 
judge-made warranties that respond to modern changes that put the 
consumer at risk for economic harm. Unsafe electronic payment systems 
likewise pose significant risks to consumers, particularly of data theft. One 
of the beauties of the common law is that courts can refine it to respond to 
modern conditions; indeed, the common law’s “continued vitality . . . 
depends upon its ability to reflect contemporary community values and 
ethics.”179 Payment cards are a wonderful innovation,180 but the misuse of 
the data that is collected from the users of those cards is a significant 
problem. Judges should recognize that consumers feel less secure in their 
financial lives when their data is compromised and fashion a warranty to 
compensate them for their losses. 
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